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One of the most important issues surrounding international courts is whether they can
further the dual causes of peace and justice. None has been more ambitious in this regard than
the International Criminal Court (ICC). And yet the ICC has been the object of a good deal of
criticism. Some people claim it has been an expensive use of resources that might have been
directed to other purposes. Others claim that its accomplishments are meager because it has
managed to try and convict so few people. And many commentators and researchers claim that
the Court faces an inherent tension between the dual objectives of securing the peace and ending
impunity for perpetrators of some of the most egregious crimes, including genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. 2
This chapter assesses the ability of the ICC to deter. In so doing, we follow the lead of the
introduction and think not only about the Court’s performance in the narrow sense (e.g., how
many people have been tried?) but rather think about the ways in which the ICC has contributed
to a broader culture that refuses to tolerate impunity for violations of international criminal law.
Because we must limit our topic to manageable proportions (and because we are social scientists
and not lawyers) our focus is primarily on outcome performance rather than procedural
performance. We focus on two outcomes alluded to in the introductory chapter: 1) reaching
desired goals, and 2) deterring atrocities against civilians.
As a criminal court, the ICC is much different than courts that settle disputes between
states or disputes between private parties (e.g., investors) and states. The ICC fits four out of five
of the criteria set out in the introduction. It decides issues of guilt or innocence on the basis of
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Rome Statute, Article 5(1)a-d.
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international law (greatly influenced in this case by domestic criminal procedures); it follows
pre-determined rules of procedure, detailed in the Rome Statute, its founding document; the
Court issues legally binding decisions and is composed of independent judges. States are parties
to the Rome Statute, but only individuals are on trial in the criminal cases that come before the
Court. 3 The Office of the Prosecutor has been empowered by the States Parties to bring criminal
charges against individuals accused of violations of international criminal law.
There are many ways one could judge the ICC’s performance. It might be evaluated
based on its contribution to justice (Goodman and Jinks 2003), on its normative value (Bass
2003), on its capacity to offer societal “atonement” (Bikundo 2012), and/or on its legitimacy in
the eyes of local victims (Clark 2011a). We will concentrate on examining the extent to which
the ICC succeeds in achieving its desired outcomes (Introduction). The preamble of the Rome
Statute makes it clear that the ICC’s job is to improve the possibility of deterring the most
egregious human rights violations and war crimes. The Court understands its own mission as
being “to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community.” 4 Indeed, in its referral to the ICC, Uganda (the first state to refer a
case to the Court) appealed for “the suppression of the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole,” although it is widely recognized in this case that the intent
was to wield a legal threat against rebels alone. 5 At the same time, the purposes of the ICC were
States Parties may have an active role in admissibility proceedings. See for example Rome Statute,
Articles 17-19.
4
ICC, at https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx.
5
“Referral of the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army,” submitted by The Republic of
Uganda, 16 December 2003. At
http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/~abranch/Current%20Projects/Uganda%20ICC%20Referral%202003.pdf.
The original referral reflects the government of Uganda’s hope that the Court could be used to prosecute
rebels alone. While this was in fact the decision of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in this case,
referrals inherently allow for investigation and indictments of any individuals. See the discussion in
Nouwen (2103), pp. 114-115.
3
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to be achieved while protecting state sovereignty to prosecute crimes committed in their
jurisdictions, through complementarity. 6
How should we then assess the performance of the Court? We present evidence of two
kinds: first, we look for the imprint of the ICC on domestic law. In the case of the ICC, States
Parties have strong incentives to reconcile domestic criminal statutes with international criminal
law, since to do so allows them to take jurisdiction should they want to do so. 7 One of the major
performance outcomes of the ICC is therefore the extent to which it has encouraged legal change
within the domestic crime statutes of members. Second, we look for actual evidence that the
ICC or the domestic laws it has encouraged have contributed to crime deterrence. Does the
extension of the ICC jurisdiction through ratification actually deter the crimes it was designed to
punish? Do changes in crime statutes that the ICC has stimulated done so?
Evidence exists that the ICC has performed well in this regard (Jo and Simmons 2016).
We discuss broad-based evidence of its deterrence effects, but we also focus in on a specific and
very violent case: that of Uganda. We believe there is some evidence that the ICC has deterred
some heinous crimes even in this difficult case. We discuss the evidence that the ICC’s
jurisdiction and action have deterred both state agents and rebel groups from committing
atrocities against civilians in this case. In so doing, we recognize that this may not be what the
government of Uganda originally intended when they ratified the ICC. Nonetheless, as the
Concerns about preserving state sovereign via carefully worded complementary jurisdiction was a
strong emphasis of many states during negotiation of the ICC statute. See paragraphs 91-93 and 100 of
the United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court General Assembly Official Records, Fiftieth Session Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22), Available at
http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc21168.pdf.
7
A case is inadmissible when “The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it” (Rome Statute, Article 17(1)(a)). If a states wants to have a credible objection to
admissibility, then, there are clear incentives to define the crimes listed in Article 5(1)a-d in domestic
criminal statutes.
6
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introduction entreats us, we should look for evidence of court performance in individual cases as
well as more broadly. The case of Uganda helps us to understand, in greater detail, just how
international justice institutions, such as the ICC, become relevant on the ground.

I.

Background on the ICC

The twentieth century has been a remarkable period of international judicialization. 8
International courts and court-like institutions have sprouted in surprising numbers to deal with
specific functional problems, like conflict over trade agreements or disagreements over the
application of the Law of the Sea, and regional concerns such as individual human rights. The
ICC is different from nearly all of these institutions. Post-Cold War internal conflicts caused
non-governmental human rights, humanitarian organizations, and some states 9 to call for an end
to impunity for crimes against humanity and genocide (Lee 1999, Pace and Schense 2002,
Glasius 2006). International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and then Rwanda
primed the international community to think about the creation of the International Criminal
Court (Tochilovsky 2003, Danner 2006). After several years of negotiation, a standing Court was
established with the ability to prosecute high officials – even national leaders. Today, the ICC is
the only international court devoted to the enforcement of international criminal law, holding

On the development of international law and judicial institutions over the past few decades see (Abbott
2000, Keohane, et al. 2000). On the development of “new style” ICs that give individuals a right to
launch cases (in criminal cases, a prosecutor) see Alter (2011).
9
See for example the Statement of Norway, Nov. 12, 2001, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Norway6thComm12Nov01.pdf.
8
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individuals accountable for violations with the potential to imprison for life persons convicted of
such crimes, operating potentially on a global scale.
The Court has jurisdiction over all potential cases of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes that occur after July 1, 2002 in the territory of a state that has ratified the treaty
or that are committed by a national of such a state. 10 Unlike the traditional model exemplified
by the International Court of Justice, the treaty creating the ICC does not allow States Parties to
decide whether or not to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. 11 Furthermore,
unlike the original draft treaty for the Court, 12 the Rome Statute invests a prosecutor with the
ability to commence cases on her or his own initiative without relying solely on the referrals of
states (Danner 2003:513-15). 13 The Rome Statute does not allow States Parties to make
reservations to its provisions. 14 Adherence is an all-or-nothing choice. 15 In addition, the ICC
does not recognize any of the immunities traditionally accorded to heads of state and other senior
officials under international law. In fact the treaty overrides any immunities that states may grant

Rome Statute, art. 12(2). In addition, the Court has jurisdiction over any case referred to it by the
United Nations Security Council under its Chapter VII authority, whether or not the state where the
alleged crimes occurred has ratified the treaty.
11
A non-party state may also accept the jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc basis with regard to that
particular situation. Rome Statute, Art. 12(3).
12
Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, in Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43-45 (Art. 23 & Art. 25),
UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 46, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
13
While frivolous or politically-motivated prosecutions are a possibility (and one that has particularly
concerned the United States), the Rome Statute has checks built into it to discourage a prosecutor from
acting irresponsibly. These are described further in (Danner 2003).
14
Rome Statute, Art. 120.
15
The treaty does officially allow countries to decline to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction for seven years
after the state becomes a party to the treaty. Rome Statute, Art. 124. Furthermore, the Court does not
have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression until 2017. See RC/Res.6 “The Crime of Aggression”
(Kampala Amendment, 2010) at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6ENG.pdf.
10
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to presidential, parliamentary, or legislative officials in their domestic systems. 16 The result is a
court much more independent of state control in the initiation of cases and far less protective of
state sovereignty than was originally contemplated or has ever existed in modern history.
Enthusiasts of the ICC point out that its membership is very widespread. As of 2015, 123
states had ratified the Rome Statutes (Figure 1), thus becoming parties to the agreement and
placing their nationals under the Court’s (complimentary) jurisdiction. Detractors, however, see
the glass as much more than half empty, with some of the most powerful and populous states in
the world – including the United States, India, China and Indonesia – as non-members. Some
argue the Court has been overwhelmed, while others argue it has not done much. On this point,
we simply let the facts speak for themselves: the ICC has issued 31 arrest warrants (eight
individuals remain fugitives), heard 23 cases, and convicted two men (Thomas Lubanga in 2012,
and Germain Katanga in 2014, both rebel leaders of different rebel organizations in Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC)). The Court is now examining crimes against humanity in Uganda,
the Central African Republic, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and Mali, and has
begun preliminary investigations to decide whether or not to proceed with indictments 17 in
Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras and Nigeria.

[Figure 1 about here]

Rome Statute, Art. 27.
We use the words “indict,” “indictment” and “indictee” to refer to persons for whom the ICC has
served warrants and related processes. The word “indict” does not appear in the Rome Statute.

16
17
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This background information about the ICC powers and purposes are food for thought.
But its performance should be assessed systematically, and we suggest the best outcome
performance measure is the extent to which the ICC has helped to deter the crimes within its
jurisdiction. This can be done indirectly (through the development and encouragement of
national capacities) and directly, by sending strong signals that impunity is a waning option.

II.

The ICC and Deterrence: Theory and Mechanisms

In this section we justify our focus on the capacity of the ICC to deter crimes within its
jurisdiction as one of the most important aspects of its performance, of which there are
potentially many. We cannot possibly address all aspects of institutional performance in a single
paper. Nor is our expertise in process performance. We therefore concentrate on outcome
performance. Second, we refrain from attempting to read the minds of the creators of the ICC by
devising creative interpretations of the Court’s purposes. Instead, we take seriously the plain
meaning of the words of the preamble of the Rome Statute: the ICC was meant, at least
indirectly by addressing impunity, to contribute to the prevention of international crimes. For us,
this means the ICC was designed to deter the kinds of atrocities that are within its jurisdiction.
Note this does not mean the ICC was created to put an end to war, although the preamble clearly
expresses the idea that such crimes do “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the
world…” Nor should the ICC be judged by the (inevitable) fact that some perpetrators may not
actually face trials. The preamble is clear that the purpose of the ICC is to “put an end to

9

impunity,” which means that there should no longer be presumed exemption from punishment. 18
The extension of jurisdiction via ratification ends impunity understood as exemption. No one is
exempt from consequences flowing from the obligation to refrain from committing crimes under
the ICC’s jurisdiction. International criminal law applies to all, whether or not a specific
individual actually faces trial. The number of trials held is, for our purposes, only relevant
insofar as it undermines the ability of the ICC to contribute to the prevention of international
crimes. The key performance indicator therefore should be: has the ICC contributed to crime
deterrence?

We argue that it has. Prosecutorial deterrence refers to the omission of a criminal act out
of fear of sanctions resulting from legal prosecution. People are increasingly likely to be deterred
from violating the law when the chances and severity of a legal sanction, such as a fine,
incarceration or capital punishment, increases. As such, law violation is a function of prosecution
and sentencing. As the risk of more severe penalties is perceived to increase, the likelihood that
an individual will commit a crime is reduced and the crime rate falls (holding any “utility”
resulting from the violation constant).

For decades, the criminal deterrence literature has debated the question of exactly which
elements of this rationalist model account for the deterrence of criminal behavior. The idea that
severity of punishment largely drives deterrence (Grasmick and Bryjak 1980) fueled the move
toward harsher sentencing in the United States in the 1980s. However, a growing consensus in
the deterrence literature suggests that the swiftness and especially the likelihood of punishment
See https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8#q=define%20impunity.
18
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may more effectively deter crime than severity of punishment (Kleiman 2009, Wright 2010).
Empirical researchers employing surveys, experiments and scenarios also conclude that the
likelihood of punishment is key for deterring crimes ranging from tax evasion to theft to sexual
assault (Nagin and Paternoster 1993, Nagin 1998).

Raising the risk of punishment where the rule of law is otherwise weak is precisely the
formal role envisioned for the ICC. The Court was designed to do this in two ways. The first is
through its own authority to prosecute. The Court’s jurisdiction applies to cases of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes 19 that occurred after July 1, 2002 in the territory of a
state that has ratified the treaty or that is committed by a national of such a state or in cases
referred to it by the UN Security Council. 20 The Office of the Prosecutor ultimately decides
which situations to pursue, but cases may be referred by member states (e.g., Uganda, the DRC,
the Central African Republic, and Mali), the Security Council (Sudan and Libya), or initiated by
the Prosecutor herself (Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire).

General deterrence is only possible if the Court’s existence and actions raise the
perceived likelihood that an individual will be tried and punished. Above we discussed the
growing salience of international criminal law by various measures. To date, the ICC prosecutor
has indicted more than 35 persons, and a further nine situations (involving Afghanistan,
Honduras, Korea, Nigeria, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, Palestine, and Ukraine) are under
preliminary examination for jurisdiction and admissibility. Prosecutorial deterrence theory
implies that investigations, indictments and especially successful prosecutions should trigger a
19
20

See Rome Statute, Article 5. We refer to these below as “ICC crimes” or “international crimes.”
Rome Statute, Art.12(2); Chapter VIII covers UNSC authority to refer.
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reassessment of the likelihood of punishment and a boost to general deterrence (Geerken and
Gove 1975) – a result consistent with Kim and Sikkink’s (2010) study of national human rights
trials in transition countries.

The most common rejoinder of ICC skeptics is that nine investigations and 35
indictments is not much, and not enough to affect the behavior of governments and rebels locked
in violent conflict with each other with civilians as pawns often in between. Our first response is
that 35 indictments is considerable, compared to impunity. But moreover, there is no reason we
should suppose governments and rebels sift through evidence in a completely objective way.
These actors are as susceptible as any other with a human brain in their heads to biases produced
by availability heuristics. Availability heuristics, for example, make it far more likely that
people will remember ICC investigations and warrants rather than their lack, as well as
convictions rather than acquittals. The former are salient while the latter often go unnoticed. Just
as an example, a look at google trends for 2012 shows a significant search trend for Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (who was convicted for war crimes in March 2012) yet nothing but a flat line for
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (who was acquitted for similar crimes in December that same year). The
name of the convicted man also has about 30 per cent more google hits, and 230 per cent more
press coverage, as measured by articles in the Lexis-Nexis database, than the name of the
acquitted man. Conviction is news; acquittal, not so much. 21 Note we are not claiming that
rebels and government officials do these searches; we are simply demonstrating that small
numbers of convictions do not undercut our deterrence argument for well-known psychological

The trial of Slobodan Milosevic provided an exceptionally poignant image of a national leader
subjected to the humiliation of an international trial.

21
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reasons. Arguably, the ICC is an institution that is likely to make the risk of punishment both
salient and vivid.

The common rejoinder also neglects a crucial indirect deterrence mechanism. The Rome
Statute’s “complementarity regime” creates a channel for the ICC to support prosecutorial
deterrence at the national level as well. The ICC is designed to complement, and not to preempt
or substitute for national prosecution. 22 National courts have the option of investigating a case
domestically before the ICC can adjudicate it. 23 As the Court’s first prosecutor stated,
“intervention by the ICC must be exceptional—it will only step in when states fail to genuinely
act.” 24 The ICC may nonetheless find a case admissible despite domestic action if the Court
determines that “the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution.” 25 Sudan’s desultory investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed in Darfur
provide an example of the kind of behavior the admissibility provisions were designed to
override (ICC 2006).

This complementarity principle bolsters the ICC’s prosecutorial deterrence to the extent
that it creates incentives for states to strengthen their own legal capacities to try and convict
individuals of international crimes (Dunoff and Trachtman 1999, Burke-White 2008). A recent
ICC report to the United Nations notes several national legal reforms implemented after the

See Rome Statute, Preamble (emphasizing that the ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions”).
23
See Rome Statute, Preamble and Art.1. For a discussion of the conditions under which domestic courts
are likely to enforce international human rights law, see Lupu (2013).
24
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Global Web of Justice is up and Running, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 12,
2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/11/opinion/edocampo.php.
25
Rome Statute, Art.17(1)(a).
22
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launch of preliminary examinations, including reforms in Guinea, Colombia, and Georgia (ICC
2011). Sarah Nouwen (2013) documents how ICC investigations catalyzed legal reforms in
Uganda and Sudan. Uganda’s ICC implementing legislation was passed only recently, in 2010,
but it facilitates prosecution of international crimes in the Ugandan High Court (Nouwen and
Werner 2011).

The evidence that the Rome Statute has contributed to strengthening of the laws and
institutions to deter international crimes is strong and systematic. A careful look at the dates of
ratification and of domestic criminal law reform indicates that ICC ratification precedes most of
these crime statute reforms, indicating that the reform cases are, in fact, plausibly connected with
the ICC regime. 26 Among the 44 ratifying countries, 10 countries did not reform their crime
statutes at all, 28 countries implemented some reform, and 6 underwent substantial reform.
Among non-ratifying states, only 2 countries reformed their crime statutes to conform with ICC
law. Note also that the list of crime statute reformers includes unlikely candidates in the absence
of an ICC obligation: Uganda, Kenya, Niger, Cambodia, Georgia, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso,
Central African Republic, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. In a sample of over 100 states
with a post-World War history of domestic civil war violence, Jo and Simmons (2016) report a
strong statistical correlation between ICC ratification and changes in domestic crime statutes that
strengthen the ability to prosecute international crimes. Thus, an indirect channel through which
the ICC may exert prosecutorial deterrence is through stimulating domestic laws and structures
that overtime enhance the ability of national courts to act (Stahn and El Zeidy 2011),
theoretically bolstering prosecutorial deterrence. We consider this to be an indirect multiplier

26

Source: ICC Legal Tools, Implementation Database, http://www.legal-tools.org/go-to-database/.
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effect of the ICC itself. One might expect a certain asymmetry in the use of domestic law, since
governments are likely to have much more influence over the domestic legal machinery than do
their opponents, but as we show below in Uganda, government allies - local defense units, for
example – have been prosecuted at least in some instances. Arguably, national courts have
contributed to a broader system-wide expectation that impunity is no longer quietly tolerated
(Sikkink 2011). 27

But do perpetrators and potential perpetrators take note? Qualitative research reveals
such changes become part of leaders’ updated calculations. For example, the former Colombian
President Pastrana expressed concerns that he might get prosecuted by the ICC, and the
paramilitary leader, Vincente Castano of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), was
“sharply aware and fearful of the possibility of ICC prosecution, a fear that reportedly directly
contributed to his demobilization” (Grono 2012). Even some rebel groups have begun to assess
risks in the ICC’s shadow. For example, the two main rebel groups in Colombia – the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP) and the Unión Camilista - Ejército de
Liberación Nacional (UC-ELN) – have published internal documents assessing the likelihood of
prosecution by the ICC or domestic courts (Cantor and Engstrom 2011). ICC investigations,
indictments and convictions or those triggered by complementarity are likely to encourage actual
or potential perpetrators to reassess the risks of punishment – relative to the status quo, which is
often impunity – and to moderate their behavior.

Many legal experts consider the development of such national capacities to be the most important
legacy of the ICC. See Slaughter and Burke-White (2006:339-41) and Burke-White (2008).
27
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Moreover, there may be good reasons to think that changing domestic statutes matters.
For one thing, it may increase the domestic capacity to prosecute egregious human rights
violations domestically. The correlation coefficient between crime statute reform and domestic
human rights trials in the next year is strong and positive, 28 which implies a clear positive
relationship between enhanced crime statutes and trials. In other words, ratification of ICC
statutes is associated with a chain of consequences: ratification creates incentives to change
domestic laws, which in turn are associated with prosecutions. 29 Recent research suggests this
account is quite plausible. For example, Dancy and Montal (2014) find an increase in African
countries’ human rights related domestic trials of state agents, specifically after the ratification of
Rome Statute. The authors note a significant increase in the number of human rights
prosecutions and guilty verdicts following ICC investigation in Uganda 30 and DRC, 31 a moderate
increase in the Central African Republic and Sudan, and no notable trends in the case of Cote
d’Ivoire and Kenya (which are too recent to assess). We are not naïve enough to believe any of
these cases represent international standards of justice, nor do they overturn the prevalent culture

The trials variable is from Kim and Sikkink (2011). The correlation coefficient between reform and
human rights trials is .176 (p-value: 0.000). Spearman correlation test for ordered variables returns a
similar result. Spearman’s rho is 0.166 with p-value of 0.000.
29
Dancy and Sikkink (2011-2012) also find quantitative as well as qualitative evidence that “countries
that ratify treaties protecting core rights with individual accountability provisions are more likely to use
human rights prosecutions than countries that have not ratified these treaties (751).”
30
Opinions vary as to whether the trial was impartial, credible and fair Nouwen (2012a) notes that “The
prosecution of Kwoyelo was prompted by opportunism rather than law or policy. Kwoyelo is considered
of little use by the ruling party. Rather, Kwoyelo, as a Ugandan ‘Tadic’, could satisfy the ICD’s
institutional craving for a first case, and during the ICC Review Conference in Kampala the preparations
for his case served to demonstrate the host country’s commitment to international justice at home” (p.2212). See also Nouwen 2012b: “Critics charge that Kwoyelo was politically convenient; his submission for
amnesty was ignored; it was a political show before the Ugandan government hosted the ICC Review
Conference in 2010; and that it was the only trial thus far taken up by the ICD.”
31
See also the Transitional Justice Research Collaborative, events history data on human rights trials
https://transitionaljusticedata.com/.
28
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of impunity in these and similar cases, but they do suggest that some institutional change has
occurred in some of the worst cases in which the ICC has had an influence.

In sum, we argue that ICC performance should be assessed in terms of its ability to deter
the kinds of crimes under its jurisdiction. The ICC and the norms it embodies are highly salient
institutions that have caught the attention of would-be perpetrators, and influence them to
reassess their prospects for apprehension and punishment. Prosecutorial deterrence is therefore
enhanced by conditions that make prosecution more likely in a given jurisdiction, such as
ratification of the Rome Statute, passage of ICC implementing legislation, national trials or court
reforms that make trials more probable and credible. 32 In the next section, we discuss the
evidence for these propositions in one of the most violent cases: that of Uganda.

III.

ICC’s Deterrence Potential in Uganda

Uganda is one among eight situations currently on the ICC docket. Uganda was the very
first situation the Court took up in July 2004, which gives us greater temporal coverage than is
possible with other cases. The Ugandan government signed the Rome Statute in March 1999,
ratified the Statute in June 2002, and self-referred its case to the Court in December 2003. The
Ugandan military has fought the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) over two decades, and civilian
abuse and brutality are well-documented on both sides (Schomerus 2007). Many observers think
that the ICC failed in Uganda (Branch 2011) and are cynical about the Ugandan government’s
On the phenomenon of “enforcement spillovers” by which monitoring and enforcement increases
compliance even in areas without monitoring or enforcement see Rincke and Traxler (2010).
32
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self-referral to the Court, suspecting the Court’s bias (Clark 2011b). Against this backdrop, we
evaluate the effects of Court’s actions in Uganda. Is there any evidence that the jurisdiction and
actions of the Court have deterred ICC crimes? We focus specifically on violent attacks against
civilians – one of several international crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. We argue that there
is plausible evidence of a deterrent effect of the ICC, even in this case, one of the most violent
situations in which the Court has been involved.

ICC and Ugandan Military Attacks

Table 1 summarizes the key events described above, including not only military and
political developments that might impact the LRA’s behavior toward civilians, but also ICC
interventions relevant to the situation, starting from 1997.

[Table 1 about here]

Examining data from the Armed Conflict and Location Event Data (ACLED v.2) from
January 1, 1997 to March 28, 2010, reveals two general patterns. 33 First, government attacks on
civilians decreased in magnitude during this time, and those that do occur are harder to attribute
with certainty to the government. The number of “accused” (that is, unsubstantiated) attacks
increases as a share of total violations. Second, there is a reduction in coordinated actions by
government forces, such as aerial bombardments, which suggests that the Ugandan chain of
command may have refrained from coordinating military attacks against civilians, at least at the
The data include government violence against civilians within and outside of Uganda, although the
majority of violence instances occurred primarily within Uganda.
33
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highest levels. Much of this change can be attributed to the diminished presence of LRA forces
in northern Uganda and a decrease in the number of battles. But it is notable that the change in
the government’s military tactics coincides with ICC involvement as well.

The demonstrated willingness of the ICC to prosecute may also have encouraged some
changes in domestic law, institutions and practice. After ICC ratification, Uganda began to
reform its own capacity to detect and deter war crimes (Witte 2011). As noted in polls discussed
above, in the mid-2000s, Ugandans had much more confidence in the ICC than in their own legal
system. But since its encounter with the ICC, the state has invested in its domestic court system’s
capacity to try war crimes and crimes against humanity (Nouwen 2012). The ICC Bill (drafted in
2006, passed in 2010) is an example of the domestic legal changes the ICC stimulates and civil
society increasingly demands. 34 The Uganda People’s Defense Force’s reduced violence toward
civilians may be a result of both external monitoring by the international community (Allen and
Vlassenroot 2010) and internal monitoring within the UPDF itself.

Moves to prosecute war crimes domestically are also present. A remark by Uganda’s
President Museveni in 2004 reveals something of the shadow cast by the ICC on the domestic
legal regime in Uganda: “I am ready to be investigated for war crimes ... and if any of our people
were involved in any crimes, we will give him up to be tried by the ICC.... And in any case, if
such cases are brought to our attention, we will try them ourselves.” We do not think that
Museveni’s political motivations are benign – many targets for such trials were largely

For the discussion of civil society in Uganda, see Oola (2010). For example, the Uganda Victims Fund
pressured government to consider victim’s participation and reparations in the 2010 ICC Bill that set out
the domestic judicial reform.
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‘convenient’ from the government’s perspective – but they are associated with some change in
Uganda’s actual military behavior. For example, the government utilized military tribunals 35 to
try its own soldiers. Local defense units, in particular, have in fact been charged with committing
violence against civilians. 36 No one thinks the Museveni government is now free of human
rights violations. But would the government of Uganda have adopted this series of measures –
ranging from legal reform to military sanctioning – if it were not for ICC intervention? Our
answer is probably not; it is rather unlikely that such measures would have been taken if the ICC
regime was not in place and the OTP had not launched an investigation.

In short, the Court made it clear in 2004 that it was determined to prosecute. The
Prosecutor’s office opened an investigation in July 2004 and issued warrants in 2005, supported
by international efforts to pressure Sudan to cut aid to the LRA (International Crisis Group
2004). The ICC’s display of prosecutorial determination and the added threat of material
pressure by the European Union and the United States may well have contributed to a perception
on the part of the Ugandan government that the costs of law violation were likely to escalate.

ICC and the Lord’s Resistance Army

The ICC may also have had some effect on rebel behavior in Uganda. The qualitative
evidence suggests that ICC actions – in particular investigations – indirectly contributed to
internal defections. True, the first wave of rebel defection came before the ICC entered into

Such a move has been criticized, however, because military tribunals lack transparency compared to
civilian courts (Witte 2011).
36
UN report on children and armed conflict.
35
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force: after the 2000 Amnesty Law. 37 By mid-2004, more than 5000 members surrendered and
applied for amnesty. But even more defections came around the time of the announcement of the
ICC’s investigations in July 2004, the most prominent of which was the LRA’s chief negotiator
Sam Kolo in February of 2005 (Akhavan 2005). It is plausible to suppose that the defections
were related purely to the success of Operation Iron Fist that started in March 2002, at which
point LRA soldiers may have calculated the rebellion was in serious decline. But the fact that
defections occurred in 2004 suggests the additional influence of ICC investigations.

Far from undermining the domestic amnesty process, ICC investigation of the situation in
Uganda appears to have contributed to fissures within the rebel leadership (at least some of
whom were prompted to jump ship) and to have encouraged defection of rank-and-file soldiers.
The fact that Kony placed withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants at the top of his negotiating
agenda suggests that he and other LRA leaders were concerned about ICC indictments. Even if
the weakening rebel position could be attributed in good part to Sudan’s agreement to stop
supporting the LRA, the increasing likelihood of prosecution by the ICC likely entered the rebel
calculation.

Figure 2 graphs the monthly count of civilian fatalities associated with LRA attacks, as
well as vertical markers indicating where the major military and diplomatic events and ICC
actions, over time. We use monthly data of violence against civilians by the LRA from the
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED v.5). 38 The data include rebel violence
Note that the Government of Uganda adopted the Amnesty Act in 2000, after signing into the Rome
Statute in 1999. As we argued elsewhere (Jo and Simmons 2016), signature is a weaker form of
commitment than ratification. Therefore, we do not expect much deterrent effect upon signature alone.
38
For cross-national analyses on ICC crime deterrence, see Jo and Simmons (forthcoming 2016).
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within and outside of Uganda, including Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. As indicated by Table 1, there were four major ICC actions related to the
prosecution of the LRA: Uganda’s ICC Signature, Uganda’s ICC Ratification, the ICC’s
Investigation and the ICC’s issuance of Arrest Warrants. Figure 2 shows that Uganda’s signature
on the Rome Statute and issue of arrest warrants for rebel leaders did little to perturb the series.
In fact, there is a considerable spike in rebel attacks on civilians associated with ratification,
though this is likely attributable to the launch of Operation Iron Fist than with any action by the
ICC. But more crucially, there is a precipitous fall in fatal attacks on civilians by rebels occurring
just after the ICC began investigation of the situation in Uganda.

[Figure 2 about here]

Time Series Intervention Analysis

Is the ICC in some way responsible for this welcome decline? In order to answer this
question, we conduct a time-series intervention analysis. We use the logged fatalities in Figure 2
as the dependent variable due to a couple of outlier events. 39 The intervention method allows us
to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the level of a group’s
violence before and after an ICC intervention, while accounting for alternative explanations as
well as the series’ random component. If we observe no difference, then we have no reason to

In particular, there are two extreme outliers for December 2008 and December 2009, which are
nearly 3 and 4 times larger than the next highest data point, respectively. These outliers
correspond to the Christmas and Makombo Massacres in northeast DRC. Without logging, outliers
can cause our analysis to falsely present mean shifts that are not there. Logging the measure also
39

helps with concerns that the series does not have variance stationarity.
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believe that the ICC affected the outcome. But if we observe a difference over time, we will have
some evidence that the ICC affected the pattern of violence.

Intervention analysis involves two modeling decisions: whether the effects are permanent
(mean-shifting) or temporary (non-mean-shifting) and whether the effects are abrupt or gradual
(that is, the rate at which the effects appear and subside). The effects reported in these models are
assumed to permanently and abruptly shift the mean. Key events associated with the ICC
constitute a “change of state” within Uganda and we expect them to have a “permanent” impact
on the behavior of LRA. Additionally, we expect any change to be rather “abrupt” because these
ICC events are expected to have a major impact on the lives of key leaders in the LRA, who have
strong incentives to keep themselves informed and to change their behavior almost
immediately. 40 In order to model the effects of events as permanent and abrupt shifts, each
independent variable (binary indicators for Signature, Ratification, Investigation, and Warrants)
is coded as 0 for every month before the event and as 1 for every month after the event. 41

Since interventional analysis can lead to spurious results when key events of interest are
correlated with other factors and events, we use two strategies to ensure that our results are
robust: controlling for rival events. For rival events, we include events other than ICC actions
that likely caused the level of fighting to escalate or diminish. We control for two military
operations: one by the Ugandan government (Operation Iron Fist) and one by the government of

We also checked the results with different combinations of modeling assumptions: (permanent,
gradual), (temporary, abrupt), and (temporary, gradual). Permanent and abrupt models provide the best
fit.
41
. In the time-series analysis of multiple interventions, the influence of each intervention only holds until
the next event (see Montgomery, et al 2015, pg. 471).
40
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the DRC (Operations Rudia I). Moreover, we include a variable for the effect of the Juba Peace
Talks and the introduction of the United States as a conflict actor with the passage of the LRA
Disarmament Act. We also use a more general variable, Battles, which is the monthly count of
battles between the LRA and governmental or international forces. The LRA’s propensity to
exhibit violence towards civilians might also have been the result of their wartime fortunes.
Defeats might have left the group more desperate for civilian support and supplies causing them
to use violence and coercion as a means to secure these necessities. We use a variable to account
for this military balance (Government Territory Gain), which are monthly counts of battles in
which the government claimed territory. The purpose of these controls is to minimize the
possibility that we are misattributing a reduction in violence toward civilians to the ICC rather
than to other battlefield conditions.

Table 2 presents the results of intervention analysis of LRA violence. Model 1 estimates
the effects of four ICC interventions: Signature, Ratification, Investigation and Warrants. Of
these, only two ICC interventions have a significant effect on the fatality series: ratification and
investigation. Since the dependent variable is logged, the coefficients indicate a proportional
change in the mean. Model 1 indicates that approximately three civilian casualties occurred each
month from LRA attacks before Uganda ratified the Rome Statute, and after that event, the mean
increased by more than 30 times to about 104 casualties per month. However, when the ICC
demonstrated its determination actually to investigate crimes, this casualty rate plummeted by
nearly 94% to a new mean of about 6.5 casualties per month.

[Table 2 about here]
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The full model with rival events is displayed in Model 2. The results are revealing. It
appears that ICC ratification effects are largely attributable to the start of Operation Iron Fist.
Three other non-ICC events appear to have an effect on the series as well. The Juba Peace
Process depressed the casualty rate while the collapse of this peace process, and the subsequent
launching of Operation Rudia I increased the LRA violence towards civilians. This new,
increased level of violence would persist until US involvement into the conflict (LRA
Disarmament Act), when the number of casualties dropped to a rate lower than pre-Rudia levels.
In order to generate substantive results, we track the mean level of monthly casualties through
time by re-running Model 3 with just the significant events. The model estimates that the ICC
investigation was able to substantially decrease this loss of innocent life to about 11 deaths per
month, meaning that 107 fewer people lost their lives each month, even as the fighting raged on.

The final model in Table 2 (Model 4) switches our dependent variable from a
logged measure of civilian casualties to the monthly number of LRA attacks on civilians. All
events, with the exception of the Juba Peace Process, are still significant. Model 4 also shows a
rather strong relationship between the intensity of fighting and the level of LRA violence
towards civilians. Each additional battle increases the attack rate on civilians by 0.3. However,
further examination of these two series reveals a remarkable pattern. Figure 3 shows the battles
and attacks series together. Before the ICC investigation, the two series track each other rather
closely; the two series are highly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.74). But during the two-year period
between the start of the ICC investigation and the Juba Peace Process (when fighting essentially
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fell to zero), correlation between the two series weakens substantially to 0.22. 42 This is at least
suggestive evidence that the drop in civilian violence was the result of a conscious and concerted
effort by Joseph Kony and LRA leadership to decrease violence against civilians during the
investigation and not merely a consequence of battlefield dynamics.

[Figure 3 about here]

We recognize several concerns and alternative explanations in establishing plausible
causation between the ICC actions and violence patterns. First, some might question: what about
other forms of violence (e.g. torture, rape, pillaging, etc.)? Even though civilian fatalities are
down after ICC investigations, other forms of violence might increase. We investigated the
violence substitution possibility by disaggregating ACLED data into four different types of LRA
attacks: Killings, Kidnappings, Pillaging and Scorched Earth Tactics. 43 Table 3 shows the results
of intervention analysis with these four different series. 44 The key takeaway from this table is
that civilian killing was not replaced by other forms of violence. The ICC investigation led to a
statistically significant decrease in both LRA attacks with civilian deaths (Killings) as well as
those incidents that were atrocious but non-lethal (Kidnappings, Pillaging and Scorched Earth).

There is a similar pattern between logged fatalities and battles. The correlation between the series is
0.68 before the investigation and falls to 0.28 after.
43
The authors used the “Notes” sections within ACLED’s country-level datasets to ascertain these
descriptions. Keywords for killings were killed, death and fatalities. For kidnappings, it was kidnapped
and abducted. For pillaging, it was looted, raided, pillaged, robbed or stole. For scorched earth, it was
burned or torched.
42

It was the authors’ intention to test the effect of the ICC’s efforts on the occurrence of rape.
Unfortunately, this was not feasible due to the low event count in the ACLED data. It is authors’ belief
that this is result of the well-established underreporting of the crime by victims and media sources.

44
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Similar patterns for fatal and non-fatal attacks suggest that the different forms of violence are not
substitutes but occur simultaneously. 45

[Table 3 about here]

The second possibility is that the depletion in the civilian population (due to fatalities and
displacement of persons) was so significant, that at the time of the ICC interventions, there were
simply fewer civilians to kill, thus accounting for the decline in civilian fatalities. It is true that a
vast number of civilians left their homes in Northern Uganda and entered internally displaced
persons (IDP) camps. Displacement particularly impacted the three districts within the Acholi
region (Gulu, Kitgum and Pader), where nearly 95% of the population vacated their homes and
left a region the size of Belgium largely unoccupied (Bøås and Hatløy 2005). One of the Uganda
government’s major strategies was to actively isolate the LRA from civilian populations in
which the group could hide (Atkinson 2009).

However, we submit that our results are not being produced by civilian displacement for
three reasons. First, the decline of civilian fatalities does not coincide with the increase in
civilian displacement. The drop in civilian fatalities occurred in mid-2004 and it was abrupt. In
contrast, civilian displacement was gradual and experienced its sharpest increase between 2002
and 2003 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012). Second, IDP camps were not an

To be clear, the Killings variable is a count of attacks where there was at least one civilian fatality and
not a fatality count. Since, by definition, the non-fatal attacks do not have fatalities, we use a count of
fatal attacks for the Killings variable in order to provide a fairer comparison. Figures of the four series
also show very similar patterns and are on file with the authors.
45
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effective means of civilian protection; these “safe havens” were still located in Northern Uganda
and were frequently attacked by the LRA (Mills 2015). In fact, when we isolated attacks to only
those that occurred at IDP camps, we found a very similar pattern to that of the violence at
large. 46 Third, and finally, the conflict was mostly confined to three northern regions—Acholi,
Lango and Teso—but the majority of displacement was in Acholi. Our additional analysis shows
that the ICC investigation had a statistically significant downwards effect on the number of
attacks and civilian fatalities for both the Acholi region and regions lying outside of Acholi. 47
We take it as evidence that civilian displacement does not affect our conclusion about the ICC
deterrence effect.

IV.

Conclusions

The world’s first international criminal court has been a game-changer in international
criminal law. A non-conventional Court comprised of States Parties but that holds individuals
accountable for criminal acts, the ICC has become a focal institution of international criminal
law. How well has the world’s first criminal court actually performed? We have argued for a
specific understanding of performance found right in the Preamble of the Court: the ability to
prevent atrocities toward innocent civilians. We argue that deterrence is theoretically possible,
both through the actions of the ICC itself, as well as indirectly, through the impact that the ICC
has had on domestic laws and institutions designed to prosecute violators of international
criminal law.
46
47

Results on file with the authors.

Results on file with the authors.
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We test these claims in the context of an especially violent case: the Ugandan civil war.
While some might argue that the Ugandan government ratified the Rome Statutes primarily to
unleash the ICC on its political and military opponent, we found that, with the involvement of
the ICC, the government strengthened criminal statutes, improve monitoring of its own military,
and even prosecuted some of its own soldiers for atrocities. Of course, simply announcing an
investigation is not likely on its own to deter atrocities. Visible and ongoing involvement of the
ICC and clear indications of international support are likely to be necessary to send a clear signal
about the end of impunity. Nor do we claim that the ICC has revolutionized the rule of law in
Uganda. To be sure, there is much room for improvement in local justice. But the evidence
suggests ICC-inspired movement in a modestly positive direction.

We also took the case to systematic statistical analysis to see whether ICC interventions
matter on the ground; that is, whether the ICC has contributed to a reduction of violence against
civilians. We are fully aware that Uganda constitutes just one case, and that one must be careful
about generalizing. 48 Nonetheless, the results are striking. Using time series intervention
analysis, we found highly suggestive evidence that ICC actions, and in particular investigations,
have discouraged rebels from intentionally killing civilians. Some might raise the concern that
this case illustrates the risks of government impunity, since the Court only charged rebel leaders.
Regarding this possibility, however, we remind readers that nearly half of the individuals wanted
for ICC trial have been government officials.

But note that these results for Uganda are consistent with a broader set of all civil war cases analyzed
in Jo and Simmons (2016). We do not claim the ICC deters in every case, but rather that it reduces
intentional killing on average, and especially where it has ongoing investigation underway.

48
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Certainly, the ICC faces many challenges ahead. Efforts by the African Union to
undermine the Court’s legitimacy could fuel backlash. Kenyatta’s apparent “win” represented by
the ICC’s decision to drop charges against him could undermine some of the positive
developments we have discussed in this article. U.S. cooperation remains episodic, although the
January 2015 surrender and transfer of Dominic Ongwen via the Central African Republic to The
Hague for trial with American assistance is a positive sign. The surrender of this child-soldierturned-LRA-commander constitutes “…the first commander of an internationally listed terrorist
organization to give acte de presence at the [ICC].” 49 We also note that trials generally have not
delayed peacemaking in ways that early detractors predicted (Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm
2015). Much remains to be done to assess the consequences of the turn to develop and enforce
international criminal law, but this research suggests some important positive effects.

See http://africanarguments.org/2015/01/20/dominic-ongwen-born-at-the-time-of-the-white-ant-triedby-the-icc-by-thijs-b-bouwknegt/.
49
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Tables:

Table 1: Major Events for Lord’s Resistance Army (1997-2014)

Events
Uganda signs Rome Statute
Nairobi Agreement
Amnesty Act
Operation Iron Fist
Uganda ratifies Rome Statute
ICC investigation into LRA
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ICC warrants for LRA
Juba Peace Talks start
Operation Rudia I (DRC)
Juba Peace Talks fail
Operation Lightning Thunder
Operation Rudia II (DRC)
LRA Disarmament Act
US deploys military advisors
Four-nation AU force deployed
Note: ICC events in bold

Dates
03/17/1999
12/08/1999
01/21/2000
03/08/2002
06/14/2002
07/28/2004
01/09/2005
10/13/2005
07/14/2006
09/2008
11/30/2008
12/2008-03/2009
05/2009
05/24/2010
10/14/2011
03/23/2012
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Table 2: Intervention Analysis on Monthly Count of
Logged Civilian Fatalities and LRA Attacks (1997-2014)

ICC
Events
Operation Iron Fist
ICC Ratification
ICC Investigation
ICC Signature
ICC Warrants
Juba Peace Talks
Operation Rudia I
LRA Disarmament Act
Battles

Rival

Events Conditions

4.35**
(0.80)
2.79**
-0.52
(0.72)
(0.81)
-2.80** -2.40**
(0.85)
(0.50)
0.58
-0.08
(0.73)
(0.41)
0.25
0.22
(0.74)
(0.63)
-1.26*
(0.58)
3.31**
(0.46)
-3.54**
(0.41)

Govt. Gains (-1)
AR(1)
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-Squared
Bayesian Information Criterion
Durbin-Watson
Q Statistic P-value (Lags 1-36)

0.46**
0.14*
(0.06)
(0.07)
1.03
0.96**
(0.60)
(0.32)
215
215
0.481
0.610
1333.58 1289.66
2.13
1.97
0.11
0.40

*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, two-tailed test
Mean of Logged Fatalities: 1.99
Mean of Attacks: 8.38
Moving average terms are included, but not shown

Battlefield

Attacks as
DV

3.32**
(0.43)

11.97**
(2.96)

-2.04**
(0.43)

-12.52**
(3.15)

-0.86
(0.44)
3.12**
(0.45)
-3.31**
(0.41)
0.03*
(0.01)
0.06
(0.11)
0.18*
(0.07)
0.76**
(0.19)
214
0.622
1267.81
2.03
0.13

1.01
(3.22)
19.03**
(3.33)
-15.97**
(2.98)
0.33**
(0.07)
1.33*
(0.57)
0.43**
(0.06)
1.58
(1.54)
214
0.663
2001.39
2.04
0.25
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Table 3: Intervention Analysis on Different Type of LRA Attacks
on Civilians (1997-2014)

Operation Iron Fist
ICC Investigation
Juba Peace Talks
Operation Rudia I
LRA Disarmament Act
Battles
Govt. Gains (-1)
AR(1)
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-Squared
Bayesian Information Criterion
Durbin-Watson
Q Statistic P-value (Lags 1-36)

Killings Kidnappings Pillaging Scorched Earth
3.62*
2.48
1.23**
1.98**
(1.49)
(1.47)
(0.42)
(0.48)
-4.64**
-3.26*
-1.87**
-2.59**
(1.63)
(1.58)
(0.44)
(0.48)
0.62
0.66
0.77
0.76
(1.63)
(1.63)
(0.45)
(0.48)
14.60**
8.60**
0.15
-0.44
(1.75)
(1.68)
(0.47)
(0.50)
-12.80**
-5.90**
0.40
0.50
(1.55)
(1.52)
(0.42)
(0.45)
0.15**
0.13**
0.06**
0.05**
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.51
-0.67**
0.03
0.37**
(0.31)
(0.25)
(0.09)
(0.12)
0.30**
0.43**
0.27**
0.15*
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
0.42
0.41
0.06
-0.04
(0.73)
(0.80)
(0.20)
(0.22)
214
214
214
214
0.646
0.576
0.424
0.393
1773.95
1666.41
1237.14
1325.13
2.08
1.97
2.01
2.00
0.43
0.99
0.11
0.67

*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, two-tailed test
Mean of Killings: 3.52
Mean of Kidnappings: 2.91
Mean of Pillaging: 0.76
Mean of Scorched Earth: 0.59
Moving average terms are included, but not shown
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Figures:
Figure 1: States Parties to the ICC Statutes
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Figure 2: Monthly Count of Civilian Fatalities from LRA Attacks (1997-2014)
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Figure 3: Monthly Count of Civilian Fatalities from LRA Attacks Compared with

ICC Investigation
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